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Abstract
According to the common definition, the standard of reasonable doubt is a threshold such
that, the defendant is convicted if and only if the probability that the juror attaches to the
defendant being guilty is above this threshold. In this paper we prove that generically such a
threshold exists if and only if the juror reasons only about the defendant’s guilt and nothing
else. We discuss the implications of this result, and subsequently we propose a weakening of
the aforementioned definition, by substituting the standard of reasonable doubt with a pair of
standards, an upper and a lower one, thus obtaining a sufficient condition for conviction and
a sufficient condition for acquittal. Finally, we prove that the lower standard always exists,
whereas the upper standard exists if and only if the juror prefers to always convict a guilty
defendant, irrespective of the circumstances.
1. Introduction
Modelling court decisions has been a fundamental issue in the literature on economics of crime (e.g.,
Becker, 1968; Andreoni, 1991; Friedman and Wickelgren, 2006; Persson and Siven, 2007), as well as
on voting rules in (jury) committees (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Gerardi, 2000). The
most central concept in these literatures is that of the standard of reasonable doubt, which is defined
as the probability threshold for convicting/acquitting the defendant.1 Actually, the relevance of
this notion is not limited to court decisions, but is also extended to a much larger family of binary
decisions. For instance, the decision to treat a patient with a specific drug often depends on whether
∗Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands;
Tel: +31-43-38 83649; E-mail: e.tsakas@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1For an overview of the jury system, we refer to Jonakait (2003).
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the probability of success is above or below some threshold. Likewise, the decision to adopt a policy
often depends on whether the probability of this policy solving a specific problem is above or below
some threshold. In this sense, choice rules based on the concept of reasonable doubt, appear in a
wide number of fields, including law, economics, political science, health sciences, etc.
The main question that arises in relation to the notion of reasonable doubt is whether we should
formally define it. For instance, within the law literature there is a longstanding debate on this
matter (e.g., Tribe, 1971; Diamond, 1990; Mulrine, 1997; Lillquist, 2002). In fact, several scholars
are in general against the use of decision-theoretic models for court decisions (Tribe, 1971). Part of
the argumentation against formally defining a standard of reasonable doubt is based on the fact that
empirical evidence is far from being conclusive (see Section 5.1).
The aim of this paper is to provide a conclusive answer to this question using a general decision-
theoretic model.2 Our conclusion turns out to be quite surprising. In particular, our main (impossi-
bility) result proves that a standard of reasonable doubt exists if and only if the only relevant event
(from the juror’s point of view) is the defendant’s guilt. That is, if the juror reasons about other
events – such as for instance the defendant’s intention to commit the crime – there is no threshold
probability of guilt, above which (resp., below which) the juror would convict (resp., acquit) the
defendant. Note that our result is very robust, in the sense that it does not depend on which this
event could be, as long as it is relevant to the case. In fact, since it is hard to imagine of jurors who
disregard every event besides the defendant’s guilt, we can conclude that a standard of reasonable
doubt does not even exist.
The implications of the previous result are twofold. On the one hand, we strongly reinforce the
view that a standard of reasonable doubt should not be explicitly defined, even in ideal cases where
the juror’s preferences are known. However, this conclusion is not based on arguments put forth
by those opposed to a formal definition of reasonable doubt, but rather on the mere fact that the
standard of reasonable doubt is not well-defined, unless we impose the very restrictive assumption
that the juror reasons only about the defendant’s guilt and nothing more.3 Secondly, our result
implies that the extensive literature – on economics of crime or jury decisions – that uses reasonable
doubt as a choice rule, implicitly imposes the aforementioned restrictive assumption. In this sense,
some of the obtained results may have to be revisited.
In the second part of the paper, we attempt to partially resolve the impossibility result, by
weakening the definition of reasonable doubt. In particular, instead of considering a (unique)standard
2Throughout the paper, we study the concept of reasonable doubt in the context of court decisions, even though –
as we have already mentioned – our framework can also be used to model other types of decisions.
3In fact, the irony is that, using decision-theoretic tools, we reinforce the view of some scholars who are against
the use of decision theory for studying court decisions.
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such that the defendant is convicted if and only the probability of being guilty is above this standard,
we define an upper and a lower standard, such that the defendant is convicted (resp., acquitted) if
the probability of guilt is above the upper standard (resp., below the lower standard). In this sense,
we provide a sufficient condition for conviction and a sufficient condition for acquittal. Obviously, a
standard of reasonable doubt exists if and only if the upper threshold coincides with the lower one.
Then, we move on to prove that the lower standard of reasonable always exists. On the other hand,
the upper standard exists if and only if the juror prefers to convict a guilty defendant irrespective of
the circumstances. This implies that a sufficient condition for conviction may not exist if there are
extenuating circumstances, e.g., this is the case if the juror prefers to acquit a guilty defendant who
committed the crime unintentionally, over convicting him.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our framework and define the
standard of reasonable doubt. Section 3 contains our main impossibility result. In Section 4 we
define the weak standard of reasonable doubt and we prove our positive result. Section 5 contains a
discussion. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Definition of reasonable doubt
There are two agents, a (female) juror and a (male) defendant. Let (Ω, E) be a measurable state
space. Each state ω ∈ Ω is a full description of all relevant aspects of the world, implying that if the
state is known all uncertainty – about both past and future events of interest – is resolved. Each
subset in the σ-algebra E is an event. Let G ∈ E be the event that the defendant is guilty of the
crime he is accused for, with the complement I := ¬G denoting the event that he is innocent. Note
that G is a coarse description of the world, in the sense that it contains different specifications of
how the crime could have taken place, e.g., there are different ways of committing a crime, differing
for instance in the defendant’s intention to commit the crime or in the degree of cruelty involved. In
either case, we assume that the law is detailed enough to clearly specify at which states the defendant
is considered guilty (resp., innocent). Thus, the events G and I have a well-defined interpretation in
the natural language.
A finite algebra F ⊆ E of subsets of Ω is called a frame, and contains the events that the juror
reasons about. Events outside F are not even considered by the juror, either because she is unaware
of them or because she consciously disregards them. We define the frame R ⊆ E to be the collection
of events that the juror reasons about at the time of her decision. Actually, R could be the outcome of
some reasoning process undertaken by the juror, thus implying that the juror may consider different
frames throughout the trial, before she eventually ends up reasoning about the events in R. This
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reasoning process is not explicitly modelled, and we focus directly on its outcome, i.e., on the frame
R. We naturally assume that the event G is always R-measurable, and a fortiori so is the event I,
i.e., the juror always reasons about the defendant’s guilt/innocence. In fact, if she reasons only about
G, her algebra R will be G := {Ω, G, I, ∅}. Let P ⊆ R denote the partition of Ω that generates R.4
Let X ⊆ [0,∞] be the set of all possible decisions that the juror could take according to the law.5
Throughout the paper we naturally assume that 0 ∈ X, i.e., acquitting the defendant is one of the
possible outcomes. For notation simplicity we define X+ := X \{0}. The juror has an R-measurable
state-dependent utility function U : Ω→ RX and forms a subjective belief pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R),6 such that
her preferences are represented by the state-dependent expected utility (SDEU) function,
EpiU(x) =
∫
Ω
Uω(x)dpi(ω). (1)
There are various axiomatizations of state-dependent expected utility functions in the literature,
both within the Savage and the Anscombe-Aumann framework (Fishburn, 1973; Karni et al., 1983;
Karni, 1993a,b).
Before moving forward, let us elaborate on how our SDEU function emerges. First, we fix the
frame R. Second, we fix the R-measurable state-dependent utility function U , which represents
the juror’s preferences (over the set of R-measurable acts) at the time of the decision. We allow her
preferences to be frame-dependent.7 In this sense, our model is rich enough to capture framing effects.
While the utility function may vary across frames, it is still stable, in the sense that it is specified
for every given frame before the juror enters the courtroom. In other words, changes in the utility
function during the trial can occur only due to changes in the frame that she considers. The latter
implies that we could also think of the juror’s utility function (given an arbitrary fixed frame) as
some ideal (frame-dependent) social welfare function carried by the representative ideal juror (under
this frame). Thus, the utility function could in principle even have a normative interpretation, even
though we do not postulate that this is necessarily the case.8
Finally, the juror forms a belief pi about the events in R. Once again, the juror’s belief may
4The σ-algebra generated by a collection of eventsQ ⊆ E is denoted by σ(Q) and is the smallest σ-algebra containing
all subsets in Q. For a given finite algebra R, there exists a unique (finite) partition P such that R = σ(P), e.g.,
G = σ({G, I}).
5It may be sometimes convenient to interpret ∞ as the death penalty, though we do not need to do so for the
purposes of this paper.
6As usual, RX denotes the set of all functions from X to R, while ∆(Ω,R) denotes the set of all probability
measures over the measurable space (Ω,R).
7Ahn and Ergin (2010) also consider preferences that vary across different frames. However, their model differs
from ours in that their utility function does not depend on the frame. Instead, differences in the preferences across
different frames are reflected only on the juror’s subjective beliefs.
8For a detailed discussion on the normative nature of the juror’s utility function, see Lillquist (2002).
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change during the trial. This can be either due to changes in the frame that she considers, or due
to updating given a fixed frame. In any case, such changes are part of her reasoning process, which
– as we have already mentioned – we do not model here.9 Unlike the utility function, the juror’s
beliefs have no normative side, i.e., there is no restriction on what the juror should believe. Overall,
the probability space (Ω,R, pi) reflects the juror’s subjective assessment of the situation at the time
of her decision.
Since U is R-measurable, for each P ∈ P there exists some UP ∈ RX such that Uω = UP for all
ω ∈ P . This also implies that Eq. (1) can be rewritten as
EpiU(x) =
∑
P∈P
pi(P )UP (x). (2)
Example 1. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and E = 2Ω. Moreover, let G = {ω1, ω2} and assume that the
juror reasons only about the defendant’s guilt/innocence, i.e., R = G = {Ω, {ω1, ω2}, {ω3}, ∅}. In
fact the two states in G differ in the defendant’s intention to commit the crime, viz., at ω1 the
defendant committed the crime unintentionally, whereas at ω2 he did it intentionally. However, the
juror does not reason about the defendant’s intentions, i.e., {ω2} /∈ R, and therefore she does not
distinguish between ω1 and ω2. Then, the juror’s state-dependent utility function Uω : X → R is
such that Uω1 = Uω2 . Thus, we define UG := Uω1 = Uω2 and UI := Uω3 . The rough interpretation is
obvious: UG (resp., UI) is the juror’s utility whenever the defendant is guilty (resp., innocent). This
framework, with R = G, is the one considered by most papers in the literature (e.g., Andreoni, 1991;
Connolly, 1987; Friedman and Wickelgren, 2006). /
Throughout the paper we impose the following natural assumption.
Assumption 1. For every x ∈ X+, we let Uω(x) < Uω(0) for every ω ∈ I. /
The interpretation is straightforward, viz., the juror prefers acquitting an innocent defendant over
convicting him, irrespective of the circumstances or the magnitude of the sentence. Notice that we
do not require the juror to necessarily prefer convicting a guilty defendant, as this may depend on
the precise circumstances under which the crime was committed or on the magnitude of x.
According to the standard definition, from the juror’s point of view the defendant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt whenever the probability pi(G) that she attaches to the defendant being guilty is
9Reasoning processes that fit our framework are the ones of existing models of rational inattention (De Oliveira et
al., 2016) or costly contemplation (Ergin and Sarver, 2010), where the juror chooses how much (costly) effort to exert
into resolving her subjective uncertainty about her beliefs or her preferences respectively. Another possibility, also
consistent with our setting, consists of the models of persuasion, where the prosecutor decides how much effort to put
into collecting evidence, and the juror’s belief is a noisy function of the collected evidence (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011, 2014).
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larger than some fixed threshold.10 We will often refer to this threshold as the standard of reasonable
doubt.
Let us introduce some additional notation and terminology. For an arbitrary R-measurable
U : Ω → RX and a given x ∈ X+, define the R-measurable function V (x) : Ω → R by Vω(x) :=
Uω(x) − Uω(0), and we naturally obtain VP (x) := UP (x) − UP (0) and EpiV (x) := EpiU(x) − EpiU(0)
for an arbitrary pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R). Then, we define the (compact and convex) subsets of ∆(Ω,R),
Cx := {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) ≥ 0}
Dp := {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ p},
where Cx is interpreted as the set of beliefs that make the juror weakly prefer to convict the defendant,
and Dp is interpreted as the set of beliefs that put probability at least p to the defendant being guilty.
Definition 1. Fix an arbitrary R-measurable U : Ω→ RX and an arbitrary x ∈ X+. Then, we say
that px ∈ R+ satisfies the reasonable doubt criterion for the sentence x ∈ X+ if Cx = Dpx .
In other words, px satisfies the reasonable doubt criterion for x ∈ X+ whenever
EpiU(x) ≥ EpiU(0)⇔ pi(G) ≥ px, (3)
i.e., a juror (weakly) prefers to convict the defendant if and only if the probability she attaches
to the defendant being guilty is at least equal to px. This definition is standard in the literature
(e.g., Andreoni, 1991; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998). Note that the standard of reasonable is
subjective, only as long as U represents the juror’s own preferences. If we instead adopt the normative
interpretation of U being some ideal social choice function, the standard of reasonable doubt becomes
objective.
Example 1 (cont). Recall our example with Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, G = {ω1, ω2} and R = G. Let
UG(x) = −x2 + 2x− 1 and UI(x) = −x+ 1. Now, take the sentence x = 1, and observe that
C1 = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G)UG(1) + (1− pi(G))UI(1) ≥ pi(G)UG(0) + (1− pi(G))UI(0)}
= {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ 1/2}
= D1/2,
thus implying that p1 = 1/2 satisfies the reasonable doubt criterion. /
The sentence x ∈ X+ is said to be trivial if either V (x) ≥ 0 or V (x) ≤ 0.11 It is nontrivial
otherwise. Note that if we impose Assumption 1, it cannot be the case that V (x) ≥ 0, and therefore
x ∈ X+ is nontrivial if and only if there exists some ω ∈ G such that Uω(x) > Uω(0).
10Obviously, pi(G) is well-defined, since G ∈ R and pi ∈ ∆(X,R).
11For an arbitrary Y : Ω→ R, we write Y ≥ 0 whenever Y (ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
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Proposition 1. Let px ∈ R+ satisfy the reasonable doubt criterion for x ∈ X+. Then,
(i) x is nontrivial if and only if px ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) if x is nontrivial, then px is unique.
Throughout the rest of the paper, if there exists some px satisfying the reasonable doubt criterion,
we refer to it as the standard of reasonable doubt. In the next section, we investigate the
conditions under which a standard of reasonable doubt exists.
3. Existence of standard of reasonable doubt
So far, we have defined the standard of reasonable doubt, but we have not answered the most
fundamental question, viz., does it always exist? It turns out that this is possible only under very
stringent conditions.
Main (Impossibility) Theorem. Fix a nontrivial x ∈ X+. Then, there exists some px ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying the reasonable doubt criterion if and only if V (x) : Ω→ R is G-measurable.
The main conclusion of the previous result is strong and surprising. It essentially says that a
standard of reasonable doubt does not even exist, unless either (i) the juror reasons only about the
defendant’s guilt/innocence and nothing else, or (ii) she reasons about additional events but does
not find them relevant. Let us illustrate such a case with an example.
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, with G = {ω1, ω2} and F = {ω2} denoting the event that the
defendant is guilty and the event that he intended to commit the crime respectively. Moreover,
assume that the juror reasons about every event, i.e., R = σ({F,G}) = 2Ω, thus implying that
∆(Ω,R) = ∆(Ω). Furthermore, let the juror’s state-dependent utility function be such that Uω1(x) =
−x2 + 4x, Uω2(x) = −3.5x2 + 4x and Uω3(x) = −x+ 1. Take the sentence x = 1, and observe that
C1 = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω) : 4pi(ω1) + 1.5pi(ω2) ≥ 1}
6= {pi ∈ ∆(Ω) : pi(ω1) + pi(ω2) ≥ p}
= Dp
for all p ∈ R+, thus implying that there is no standard of reasonable doubt. Of course, this is
obvious given our Impossibility Theorem, since U(1) is not G-measurable, viz., Uω1(1) 6= Uω2(1). Let
us illustrate graphically why this is the case. First, note that the shaded area contains to the beliefs
in C1 = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω) : EpiV (1) ≥ 0}. The area above the dashed linear segment contains the beliefs in
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Figure 1: Nonexistence of standard of reasonable doubt.
Dp = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω) : pi(G) ≥ p}. Now take the belief pi1 ∈ ∆(Ω), and observe that pi1(G) < p1, while at
the same time Epi1V (1) > 0, which is an obvious violation of (3). Intuitively, this is because the juror
convicts the defendant under the belief pi1 and acquits him under pi2, even though pi2(G) > pi1(G).
This is because under pi1 she deems much more likely than under pi2 that the defendant committed
the crime intentionally, conditional on him being guilty. /
Remark 1. Observe that whenever the juror reasons about events outside G, the set of utility
functions such that V (x) is G-measurable is Lebesgue-null. Therefore, generically, a standard of
reasonable doubt exists if and only if the juror reasons only about events in G. /
4. Towards resolving the impossibility result
The previous unexpected result suggests that perhaps the reasonable doubt criterion is too strong
to always provide a well-defined decision rule for the juror. This may explain why it has received
extensive criticism in the literature, based both on legal arguments but also on empirical evidence.
Thus, in this section we attempt to minimally relax it.
Definition 2. Fix an arbitrary R-measurable U : Ω → RX and an arbitrary x ∈ X+. Then, we
say that the pair (p`x, p
u
x) ∈ R2+ satisfies the weak reasonable doubt criterion for the sentence
x ∈ X+ if
(a) p`x is the maximum p ∈ R+ such that Cx ⊆ Dp,
(b) pux is the minimum p ∈ R+ such that Cx ⊇ Dp.
If p`x (resp., p
u
x) is unique, we refer to it as the lower standard of reasonable doubt (resp., the
upper standard of reasonable doubt).
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That is, p`x is the largest threshold such that
pi(G) ≤ p`x ⇒ EpiU(x) ≤ EpiU(0), (4)
i.e., the juror acquits the defendant when the probability that she attaches to him being guilty is
below p`x, but does not necessarily convict him if the probability is larger than p
`
x. In this sense, (a)
postulates a sufficient condition for acquittance. On the other hand, pux is the lowest threshold such
that
pi(G) ≥ pux ⇒ EpiU(x) ≥ EpiU(0), (5)
i.e., the juror convicts the defendant when the probability that she attaches to him being guilty is
above pux, but does not necessarily acquit him if the probability is smaller than p
u
x. In this sense, (b)
postulates a sufficient condition for conviction.
Proposition 2. Fix a nontrivial x ∈ X+.
(i) There exist a lower standard of reasonable doubt p`x ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) There exist an upper standard of reasonable doubt pux ∈ (0, 1] if and only if Vω(x) ≥ 0 for every
ω ∈ G.
The previous result implies that a sufficient condition for acquittal always exists. On the other
hand, a sufficient condition for conviction exists if and only if the juror prefers to always convict a
guilty defendant, irrespective of the circumstances under which the crime could have been committed.
The latter could also provide a possible justification of why the death penalty has been abolished
by most countries, e.g., if it is preferred to acquit a guilty defendant who committed the crime
unintentionally over punishing him to death, there is no upper standard of reasonable doubt. Let us
provide a graphical illustration of the two weak standards of reasonable doubt.
Example 2 (cont). Recall the example from the previous section (Figure 2.a), observing that
Vω(1) ≥ 0 for every ω ∈ G. Consider p`1 = 1/4 and pu1 = 2/3. The area above the lower dashed linear
segment contains the beliefs in D1/4 = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω) : pi(G) ≥ 1/4}, while the area above the upper
dashed linear segment contains the beliefs in D1/4 = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω) : pi(G) ≥ 2/3}. First observe that
D2/3 ⊆ C1 ⊆ D1/4, thus implying that whenever pi(G) ≤ 1/4 the juror will (weakly) prefer to acquit
the defendant, whereas whenever pi(G) ≥ 2/3 the juror will (weakly) prefer to convict the defendant.
Still if 1/4 < p < 2/3, the juror could go either way. Indeed, for every p > 1/4, there will exist
some belief pi ∈ ∆(Ω) belonging to C1 but not to Dp, i.e., the juror would convict the defendant even
though pi(G) would be below p. Likewise, for every p < 2/3, there will exist some belief pi ∈ ∆(Ω)
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(b) Vω(x) < 0 for some ω ∈ G.
Figure 2: Existence of weak standards of reasonable doubt.
belonging to Dp but not to C1, i.e., the juror would acquit the defendant even though pi(G) would
be larger than p. Hence, the pair (p`1, p
u
1) = (1/4, 2/3) satisfies the weak reasonable doubt criterion.
Now, let us switch our attention to Figure 2.b, where the state-dependent utility function is such
that Uω1(x) = −x2 − 4x, Uω2(x) = −x and Uω3(x) = −x − 1. Notice that there exists some ω ∈ G
such that Vω(1) < 0, viz., Vω2(1) = −1. Similarly to our analysis of Figure 2.a, p`1 = 1/4 is the lower
standard of reasonable doubt. However, notice that there is no upper standard of reasonable doubt,
i.e., there is no p ∈ (0, 1] such that C1 ⊇ Dp. Indeed, even if we set p = 1, the juror may still acquit
the defendant, viz., pi attaches probability 1 to G, and still EpiV (1) < 0. /
Proposition 3. Fix some nontrivial x ∈ X+ such that Vω(x) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ G. Then, p`x ≤ pux.
Moreover, there exists a standard of reasonable doubt px ∈ (0, 1) if and only if p`x = pux.
The previous result directly suggests that, generically, the lower standard of reasonable doubt
will differ from the upper one.
5. Discussion
5.1. Empirical implications
There is extensive applied research on reasonable doubt. Large part of this literature aims at mea-
suring the standard of reasonable doubt (e.g., Nagel, 1979; Dane, 1985; DeKay, 2006; Wright and
Hall, 2007; Dhami, 2008). In particular, different ways to elicit a juror’s standard of reasonable doubt
have been proposed, such as for instance direct questioning or the utility-based approach, just to
mention a few. Not surprisingly, when comparing the estimates induced by the different approaches,
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we find them to differ significantly from each other, e.g., direct questioning typically yields a stan-
dard of approximately 0.90, whereas the utility-based approach induces a standard of approximately
0.50− 0.60 (Connolly, 1987, p.110). There are competing explanations for this discrepancy, focusing
either on the juror’s inability to understand the concept (Tribe, 1971), or on the existence of framing
effects in general (Connolly, 1987).
In the light of our Main Impossibility Theorem, we propose a third explanation, namely that
the concept of reasonable doubt is not well-defined. To make our point clearer, first observe that
the entire literature on reasonable doubt – explicitly or implicitly – assumes that the juror reasons
only about the events in G. In this respect, the discrepancy in the empirical observations may be
attributed to the – quite likely – scenario the juror reasons about events outside G, in which case
the standard of reasonable doubt does not even exist. Of course, in such a case, it would be unclear
what the experimental subject reports when asked to specify her “standard of reasonable doubt”.
One possibility, is that the subject reports a probability in the interval [p`x, p
u
x]. This would actually
justify differences between elicitation methods, as well as differences between estimates that use the
same elicitation method, even if the utility functions are assumed to be constant. Overall, we strongly
believe that this is an important open question for future research.
5.2. Objectively null events
It is quite often the case that during the trial some event is proven to be wrong. Formally, this
means that for some E ∈ R it becomes transparent that pi(E) = 0. Let us refer to this family of
events as objectively null. Obviously, when E is objectively null, it does not make sense to even
consider beliefs that attach positive probability to E when testing for the reasonable doubt criterion
(resp., for the weak weak reasonable doubt criterion). The question is whether in such a case our
analysis would still remain valid. It is quite straightforward that our model can be easily modified
by replacing the set of R-measurable probability measures with the set of R-measurable conditional
probability measures, given E. In practice, we would replace the events Cx and Dp with
Cx(E) := {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x|E) ≥ 0}
Dp(E) := {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G|E) ≥ p},
respectively, where EpiV (x|E) =
∑
P∈P pi(P |E)VP (x), and the reasonable doubt criterion would be
satisfied whenever Cx(E) = Dp(E), and likewise for its weak version. To see that this is the case,
consider the measurable subspace (E,GE) where GE := {E,G∩E, I∩E, ∅}, together with the function
V·|E(x) : E → R, defined by Vω|E(x) = Vω(x) for all ω ∈ E. Then, our Main Impossibility Theorem
states that, there exists some px satisfying the reasonable doubt criterion if and only if V·|E(x) is
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GE-measurable. Finally, it is quite straightforward to see that if the reasonable doubt criterion is
satisfied (by some px) without E being objectively null, it will also be satisfied (perhaps for some
other p′x) when E is objectively null. The converse is not necessarily true, i.e., it could be the case
that there exists some p′x satisfying the reasonable doubt criterion when E is null and at the same
time no px satisfies the reasonable doubt criterion when E is not null. This is for instance the case
in Example 1 if we set E = {ω1}.
5.3. Choosing the sentence
So far throughout the paper, we have considered cases where the juror makes a binary choice,
viz., to convict or to acquit the defendant, with the sentence that follows the conviction verdict
being some exogenously given x ∈ X+. However, it is often the case that the juror can choose
from a larger set of alternatives Y ⊆ X, which still contains 0, e.g., when there are extenuating
circumstances, the juror may decide to choose a reduced sentence. For simplicity, let Y be compact
and the utility function U be continuous. Then, for a given frame R, the juror chooses the most-
preferred sentence xpi := maxx∈Y EpiU(x) for every pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R). The fact that Y is compact and
U continuous guarantees that there exists an optimal sentence for every pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R). Obviously,
xpi may differ across different beliefs. Now, the question is whether such flexibility in choosing the
sentence could guarantee the existence of a standard of reasonable doubt. In particular, is there some
p ∈ R+ such that {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : maxx∈Y EpiV (x) ≥ 0} =: CY = Dp? The answer turns out to be
negative, even in cases where V (x) is G-measurable for every x ∈ Y . Intuitively, the reason is that
CY is convex, but does not necessarily coincide with the intersection of a half-space with ∆(Ω,R),
i.e., pi 7→ maxx∈Y EpiV (x) is not necessarily affine, whereas pi 7→ pi(G) is. Hence, our Impossibility
Theorem does not rely on x being exogenously specified.
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Sufficiency. Let px ∈ (0, 1) satisfy the reasonable doubt criterion for x ∈ X+,
and suppose – contrary to what we want to show – that x is trivial. Then, there are two possible (not
mutually exclusive) cases that we consider:
(a) Let V (x) ≥ 0. In this case, EpiV (x) ≥ 0 for every pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R). Moreover, by px > 0, it follows that
there exists some ρ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) such that ρ(G) < px. Hence, ∆(Ω,R) = Cx = Dpx ( ∆(Ω,R), which
is an obvious contradiction.
(b) Let V (x) ≤ 0. In this case, EpiV (x) ≤ 0 for every pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R), with equality holding if and only if
VP (x) = 0 for all P ∈ P with pi(P ) > 0. Hence, Dpx = Cx = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) = 0}. Now,
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consider three subcases:
(b.1) Let P ⊆ G ⇔ VP (x) = 0. Then, {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) = 1} = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) = 0},
implying that px = 1 which is a contradiction.
(b.2) Let VP (x) < 0 for some P ⊆ G. Consider ρ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) such that ρ(P ) = 1. Then, ρ ∈ {pi ∈
∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ px} and yet ρ /∈ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) = 0}, which is again a contradiction.
(b.3) Let VP (x) = 0 for some P ∈ P with P ∩ G = ∅. Consider ρ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) such that ρ(P ) = 1.
Then, ρ /∈ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ px} and yet ρ ∈ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) = 0}, which is again
a contradiction.
Thus, we conclude that x is nontrivial.
Necessity. Let x ∈ X+ be nontrivial, thus implying that the R-measurable events V +(x) := {ω ∈ Ω :
Vω(x) > 0} and V −(x) := {ω ∈ Ω : Vω(x) < 0} are both nonempty. Now, suppose – contrary to what we
want to prove – that px /∈ (0, 1). Then, there are two possible cases that we consider:
(a) Let px ≤ 0. Then, we obtain ∆(Ω,R) = Dpx = Cx, which is a contradiction, as the probability
measure ρ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) with ρ(V −(x)) = 1 does not belong to {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) ≥ 0}.
(b) Let px ≥ 1, thus implying that there are two subcases:
(b.1) Let px > 1. In this case we obtain ∅ = Dpx = Cx, thus implying that EpiV (x) < 0 for all pi ∈
∆(Ω,R). But then since V +(x) 6= ∅, the probability measure ρ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) with ρ(V +(x)) = 1 is
such that EVρ(x) > 0 which is a contradiction.
(b.2) Let px = 1 in which case CX = Dpx = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) = 1}. Now suppose that
G∩V −(x) 6= ∅ and take ρ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) such that ρ(G∩V −(x)) = 1, implying that ρ(G) = 1. But
then observe that EVρ(x) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, it must necessarily be the
case that G∩V −(x) = ∅. Now take arbitrary P ∈ V +(x) and Q ∈ V −(x), and for every λ ∈ [0, 1]
consider the probability measure µλ ∈ ∆(Ω,R) such that µλ(P ) = λ and µλ(Q) = 1 − λ. By
continuity there exists some λ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that EVµλ˜(x) = λ˜VP (x) + (1 − λ˜)VQ(x) ≥ 0. But
then µλ˜ ∈ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) ≥ 0} and at the same time µλ˜(V −(x)) > 0, which by the fact
that G ∩ V −(x) = ∅ implies that µλ˜ /∈ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) = 1}. The latter is a contradiction.
(ii) Contrary to what we want to show, suppose that there exists some p˜x 6= px satisfying the reasonable
doubt criterion. By part (i) both of them belong to (0, 1), and without loss of generality let 0 < p˜x < px < 1.
Then, Cx = Dpx ( Dp˜x = Cx which is an obvious contradiction.
Proof of Main Theorem. Necessity. Fix some R-measurable U : Ω → RX and take some px ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying the reasonable doubt criterion. Begin by identifying ∆(Ω,R) with the unit simplex over the finite
set P, which spans the hyperplane
H = {q ∈ RP :
∑
P∈P
q(P ) = 1}
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of the |P|-dimensional euclidean space. Now take the hyperplanes of H,
Hc := {q ∈ H :
∑
P∈P
q(P )VP (x) = 0}
Hd := {q ∈ H :
∑
P∈P
q(P )WP (x) = px}
= {q ∈ H :
∑
P∈P
q(P )WP (x) =
∑
P∈P
q(P )px}
= {q ∈ H :
∑
P∈P
q(P )(WP (x)− px) = 0}.
where WP (x) := 1 if P ⊆ G and WP (x) := 0 otherwise. Notice that both Hc and Hd are the hyperplanes
associated with the half-spaces Cx and Dpx respectively. Hence, by the fact that Cx = Dpx it follows that
Hc = Hd. Thus, there exists some λ ∈ R such that VP (x) = λ(WP (x) − px) for all P ∈ P. That is,
VP (x) = λ(1− px) for each P ⊆ G and VP (x) = −λpx for each P ⊆ I. Therefore V (x) is G-measurable.
Sufficiency. Fix some R-measurable U : Ω → RX such that V (x) is G-measurable. Define VG(x) :=
VP (x) for P ⊆ G and VI(x) := VP (x) for P ⊆ I. Notice that by Assumption 1, VI(x) ≤ 0. In fact, since x
is nontrivial, we obtain VI(x) < 0 and VG(x) > 0. Then,
Cx = {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) :
∑
P∈P
pi(P )VP (x) ≥ 0}
= {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G)VG(x) + (1− pi(G))VI(x) ≥ 0}
= {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G)(VG(x)− VI(x)) ≥ −VI(x)}
= {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ VI(x)/(VI(x)− VG(x))}.
Thus, px := VI(x)/(VI(x) − VG(x)) satisfies the reasonable doubt criterion, and obviously px ∈ (0, 1) since
VI(x) < 0 and VG(x) > 0, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We identify ∆(Ω,R) with the unit simplex over the finite set P which spans the
hyperplane H of the |P|-dimensional euclidean space RP , as in the proof of the Main Theorem. For any
convex set M ⊆ H, let δ∗(·|M) : H → R be the support function of M , defined by
δ∗(q|M) := sup
{ ∑
P∈P
pi(P )q(P )
∣∣∣ pi ∈M }
for each q ∈ H ⊆ RP . Then, it follows from Rockafellar (1970, p.112) that, for every q ∈ H,
M ⊆
{
pi ∈ H :
∑
P∈P
pi(P )q(P ) ≤ p
}
⇔ p ≥ δ∗(q|M). (A.1)
(i) Set M := Cx and q = −W (x), where recall that WP (x) = 1 if P ⊆ G and WP (x) = 0 if P ⊆ I, and
define p`x := −δ∗(−W (x)|Cx). Hence, by (A.1) it follows that
Cx ⊆ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ p} ⇔ Cx ⊆ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : −pi(G) ≤ −p}
⇔ −p ≥ −p`x
⇔ p ≤ p`x.
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Now, contrary to what we want to prove, assume p`x ≥ 0. Then, there exists some ρ ∈ {pi ∈ Cx : pi(G) < p}
for every p > 0. However, by Assumption 1, if pi(G) = 0 then EpiV (x) < 0, and by continuity of U , there
exists some ε > 0 such that EpiV (x) < 0 for all pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) with pi(G) < ε. Hence, by setting p := ε
we reach is a contradiction. Therefore, p`x > 0. Finally, contrary to what we want to show, assume that
p`x ≥ 1. Then, Cx ⊆ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ p} for all p ≤ 1, implying that Cx ⊆ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) = 1}.
However, by continuity, this can only be the case if VP (x) = 0 for all P ⊆ G. But then, it is the case that
V (x) ≤ 0, i.e., x is trivial, which is a contradiction. Hence, p`x is the lower standard of reasonable doubt.
(ii) Define the convex set Ax := {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : EpiV (x) < 0} = ∆(Ω,R) \ Cx. Set q = W (x), and let
pux := δ
∗(W (x)|Ax). Hence,
Cx ⊇ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ p} ⇔ Cx ⊇ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) > p}
⇔ Ax ⊆ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≤ p}
⇔ p ≥ pux,
with the first equivalence following from the fact that Cx is closed and {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ p} = clos({pi ∈
∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) > p}). Now, contrary to what we want to prove, let pux ≤ 0. Then, Cx ⊇ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) :
pi(G) ≥ p} for all p ≥ 0, implying Cx ⊇ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ 0} = ∆(Ω,R), which contradicts Assumption
1. Finally, let us prove that pux ≤ 1 if and only if VP (x) ≥ 0 for all P ⊆ G. We begin with sufficiency.
Contrary to what we want to show, let pux > 1, thus implying that Cx + {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ 1}, i.e.,
there exists some pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) with pi(G) = 1 such that EpiV (x) < 0. But this contradicts our hypothesis
that VP (x) ≥ 0 for all P ⊆ G. Finally we prove necessity. Contrary to what we want to show let VP (x) < 0
for some P ⊆ G. But then, observe that 1 ≥ pux and at the same time Cx + {pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) : pi(G) ≥ 1}, which
is a contradiction. To see this, take some pi ∈ ∆(Ω,R) such that pi(P ) = 1, which yields EpiV (x) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from Proposition 2 that Dpux ⊆ Cx ⊆ Dp`x . Hence, pux ≥ p`x. Now,
let us prove sufficiency for our second claim. If p`x = p
u
x =: px, then Dpux = Dp`x = Dpx . But, then since
Dpx ⊆ Cx ⊆ Dpx , it must be the case that Cx = Dpx , implying that px is the standard of reasonable doubt.
Finally, let us prove necessity for our second claim. Suppose contrary to what we want to prove that p`x < p
u
x.
This implies that Dpux ( Dp`x , and therefore either Dpux ( Cx or Cx ( Dp`x . This implies that there is no p
such that Cx = Dp, which is a contradiction.
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